NEHAMAS’ LIFE AS LITERATURE: A CASE FOR THE DEFENCE

I. Introduction

Of all the thinkers remembered by philosophy, it is likely that Friedrich Nietzsche has the most diverse and controversial set of interpretations on record. One recent interpretative effort is found in Alexander Nehamas’ *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*. Nehamas approaches Nietzsche from a background of existential concerns, and an effort originally interested in making sense of the problematic notion of eternal recurrence. Like most of Nietzsche’s commentators, Nehamas seeks to explicate Nietzsche’s eccentric and often contradictory cosmological and ontological views. In accomplishing this task, Nehamas informs his reading with an interpretative model whose central theme is Nietzsche’s aestheticism, “his essential reliance on artistic models for understanding the world. . .” (Nehamas 1985, 39). For the purposes of this paper, my principal concern will be the manner in which Nehamas’ model is received into the canon of Nietzsche scholarship. In particular, this paper will engage Schacht’s response as set forth in his article “On Self Becoming: Nietzsche and Nehamas’ Nietzsche” appearing in *Nietzsche Studien*, 1992.

This essay will not argue that Nehamas’ views are unremarkable, or even [un]objectionable, but rather that Schacht’s objections are not good ones. Schacht levels four principal criticisms against Nehamas’ approach to interpreting Nietzsche. These fall into the basic division of the direct and detailed, or major, objections and the more general or preliminary objections. Herein, Schacht’s objections will be presented, considered and countered in a systematic fashion. Evidence for this case will draw from two principal sources: first, testimony from Nehamas in his own defence; and second, testimony from Nietzsche that speaks for Nehamas’ view. Throughout the course of this article it will be conclusively demonstrated that Nehamas’ interpretative approach

Kinesis

should not be discounted solely on the weight of Schacht’s objections. Before commencing the central argument, I will summarize Nehamas’ picture of Nietzsche.

II. The Life as Literature Model

According to Nehamas, Nietzsche is best understood when interpreted as seeing “the world as a work of art that gives birth to itself” (Nietzsche 1979, 796). It was Nietzsche himself who suggested the possibility of validating life through good art and the necessity of suffering in the authentic creative process (Nietzsche 1967, 25). More specifically, Nehamas takes Nietzsche’s perspectivism to warrant an interpretative model structured “aesthetically.” For Nietzsche, there is no substance. As with a work of art, a literary novel for instance, reality is not subtended by a substantial substratum; rather, the (literary) world is composed of a sum of (literary) perspectives on different characters, events, and settings, each of which is completely interdependent, whose essences are relationally defined. The world, in reality, is akin to the sum of all possible perspectives within it. Furthermore, every attempt to engage this reality is necessarily an interpretative act, depriving everyone of any kind of “privileged access” to the truth. Nehamas sees Nietzsche’s perspectivism as influencing both his normative and descriptive metaphysical views. Normatively, in light of this kind of perspectivism, it seems plausible that Nietzsche would consider all values “aesthetically,” thus avoiding any possibility of privileging a single, universal hierarchy of value. Descriptively, it is ironic that, the interpretative constitution of our grammar structures our ontology (Nietzsche 1979, 484). Nietzsche’s project of “genealogy” is inspired by insight into the “metaphysics” of perspectivism. The genealogical dimension of Nietzsche’s thought is also cited within the interpretative applications of Nehamas’ model. He writes: “It is essential to Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy that it is explicitly modeled on the interpretation of texts” (Nehamas 1985, 107).
The question that remains for Nehamas is simply this: In light of Nietzsche’s remarkably anti-metaphysical position, how does he offer a criterion by which we may evaluate our own lives?

For Nehamas, the answer begins with an understanding of eternal recurrence. Nehamas reads the teaching of eternal recurrence as a script for an archetypal existential moment, not as a cosmological conjecture. Eternal recurrence is our loneliest moment when we are confronted by the demon who propositions us as follows: “this life as you now live it . . . you will have to live it once more. . . .”(Nietzsche 1974, 341). Since everything is relationally defined, to desire to change even one aspect of life is to deny it entirely. Yet, by the same token, since there are no facts about life, the lived meaning of any aspect of life is incidental, and not pre-determined. Thus, through the sculpting of life’s meaningful features, Nietzsche provides for the possibility of overcoming nihilism and dogmatism. This transcendence is accomplished in the personality as well, by giving “style” to one’s character. For Nehamas’ Nietzsche, this process is accomplished in precisely the same manner as an author forms a character in literature. In fact, Nehamas goes so far as to contend that, Nietzsche may be read as trying, “consciously to fashion a literary character out of himself, and a literary work out of his life” (Nehamas 1985, 137). Thus, in Nehamas’ model, Nietzsche is not merely scribbling about the process of giving style to one’s character; Nietzsche exemplifies his philosophy, and his work embodies it.

Unlike many of its predecessors, Nehamas’ model does not rely on any political dimension of Nietzsche’s character in coming to terms with his views. Clearly, such an a-political reading could not have accomplished the same work as a model such as Kaufmann’s has. In fact, it is arguable that Nehamas’ work was only possible in the politically diffused climate created by Kaufmann and maintained by Schacht. Consequently, I believe that the relationship between these two readings is more subtle than the mutual opposition that one might at first perceive. Yet, Schacht’s article, “On Self Becoming. . . .” contains a systematic
rebuttal of Nehamas’ model.

III- The Argument

Schacht’s two preliminary objections evidence his misgivings about the entire extended metaphor Nehamas uses to inform his model, *Life as Literature*. When considering Nietzsche’s use of aesthetic models for understanding life and the world and evaluating people and actions (Nehamas 1985, 39), Schacht remarks:

As Nehamas rather single-mindedly pursues it, however, he is led to say some quite startling and questionable things as well. For example: he not only claims that Nietzsche ‘showed that writing is perhaps the most important part of thinking,’ but also goes on to attribute to him ‘the hyperbolic view. . . that writing is also the most important part of living.’ . . . Nor is this Nehamas’ only interpretative surprise (Schacht 1992, 267).

Schacht seems to dismiss this view out of hand, simply by presenting it as incongruent with the canonical reading of Nietzsche. Yet, he does not at this point, nor later in his paper offer reasons why Nehamas’ claim is the least bit questionable.

Importantly, Nehamas has devoted an entire chapter to developing the sense of the claim that he is making here, and to dismiss it out of hand does not do it justice. In Nehamas’ view, Nietzsche’s styles, visible in and through his writings, are an “essential” part of his philosophy and are “. . . in a strict sense indistinguishable from the content of his views” (Nehamas 1985, 40). Additionally, in his writing, Nietzsche sought to actualize what he saw as the paramount achievement of Greek and Roman civilization: the making of “the grand style no longer mere art but. . . reality, truth, life” (Nietzsche 1954, 59).

As Nehamas points out, Nietzsche used his writing as his personal vehicle for “*becoming the higher human being one may*
have in one to become” (Schacht 1992, 274). This notion of becoming as overcoming is something that Schacht will later claim Nehamas has failed to give adequate consideration (Schacht 1992, 274). Yet, in Nehamas’ view, it was through his writing that Nietzsche transcended his own physical suffering and “animality”; it was through his writing that Nietzsche gave birth to the transformations not only in his own character, but in philosophy itself; and it was through his writing that Nietzsche finally gave expression to his grand nobility and style.

The second preliminary concern that Schacht voices is directed to the inconsistency between Nehamas’ claim that Nietzsche provides no “positive view of human conduct” and his claim “that he [Nietzsche] does produce a perfect instance of it” (Schacht 1992, 267). Again, this view is quite clearly developed by Nehamas. Nehamas contends that, “. . .he [Nietzsche] does not believe that there exists a single proper kind of life or person” (Nehamas 1985, 8). At the level of style, how could there be a universally applicable view of human conduct? Will it be legislated that all apples taste good? For the Übermensch, the legislators themselves, and the free spirits who aspire to the legislator’s pinnacle, how could Nietzsche provide them with anything meaningful in this regard?

Nietzsche the individualist does not see his style as suitable for everyone. He writes to Gast: “admittedly, others might perish by using the same remedies. . .” (Middleton 1969,187). Nehamas writes: “Like a handbook for producing great literature, his advice can be followed to the letter and result not simply in a mediocrity but in an actual monstrosity” (Nehamas 1985, 233). One can paint, and consider oneself a painter—even a superior painter—without being able to tell others how to paint or, more to the point, how they should paint. It was in his creations, his “written and painted thoughts” (Nietzsche 1973, 296), that Nietzsche strove to produce a perfect (textual) instance of the higher human being he envisioned. Insofar as he is present in these texts as their author, and insofar as they are characteristic of
him, so too did he actualize the greatness achieved in his works.

Significantly, also implicated in Schacht’s second preliminary criticism are the “great many problems” with the view that Nietzsche “made himself into a creature of his own texts” (Schacht 1992, 267). It is clear, though, that Nietzsche did present himself as a creature of his own texts. In Christopher Middleton’s Selected Letters, we find recurrent confessions in Nietzsche’s own hand to that effect. The following is an excerpt from a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, dated June 28th, 1883, wherein Nietzsche speaks of Zarathustra I:

Enough—I have risen above this stage of my life—and what remains of life (little, I think!) must now give full and complete expression to that for which I have endured life at all. The time for silence is past: my Zarathustra, . . . may show you how high my will has flown. Do not be deceived by this little book’s having a legendary air: behind all the plain and strange words stands my deepest seriousness, and my whole philosophy. It is the beginning of my disclosure of myself—not more! I know quite well that there is nobody alive who would do anything the way this Zarathustra is—(Middleton, 213). 3

This passage is by no means uncharacteristic of Nietzsche’s correspondence of the period1; in fact, in many respects, it lacks the succinctness and emotion of the other instances. Yet, it provides a distilled, confessional embodiment of Nehamas’ claims. Nietzsche has a personal relationship with his writings, the style of which reflects the style of their author. Clearly, Nietzsche does see himself as a creature of his own texts. Further, he uses his writing as a vehicle for transformation and self-realization. Finally, when one considers the last line cited in the letter to von Gersdorff (above), the subtle ironies of Nietzsche’s style become apparent.

Both of Schacht’s preliminary objections take the form of
accusations only, having no apparent supporting argument. The reader of Schacht’s article, though, will realize that these “preliminary” criticisms constitute a deeply rooted difference with Nehamas’ entire approach to reading Nietzsche. Further, they appear to motivate, if not structure, the remainder of Schacht’s argument. It should be remembered, though, that Schacht never formally establishes the aspects of Nehamas’ view countered in the “major criticisms” as logical consequences of, as or logically entailing, the Life As Literature model that informs Nehamas’ interpretation.

Although these two preliminary arguments in defense of Nehamas’ Nietzsche do not in themselves validate Nehamas’ reading, it is obvious that these points are central to the remainder of Nehamas’ text; hence, they must be given a more thorough consideration than they are given by Schacht.

With this concern in mind, my argument will proceed to the examination of Schacht’s direct and detailed (major) criticisms. Schacht’s principal concerns revolve around Nehamas’ dealing with the Nietzschean self—a pivotal theme of Life As Literature. Central to Schacht’s critical commentary is his claim that Nehamas is insensitive to Nietzsche’s unique use of traditional philosophical terminology, particularly in the case of the term “self” (Schacht 1992, 269). Schacht writes: “One [perspective of the self] in particular which Nehamas does not take sufficiently into account, relates to Nietzsche’s insistence upon the social nature of consciousness” (Schacht 1992, 270). Consequently, Nehamas fails to recognize that, for Nietzsche, “at a rather fundamental level, the self is a social phenomenon” (Schacht 1992, 271). Later, Schacht continues by saying that, for Nietzsche, the disciplined conditioning of the “perfect herd animal” “is a development not to be despised; for it lays the foundation for the emergence of any ‘higher’ and different, more autonomous sort of selfhood and responsibility” (Schacht 1992, 275-276). Schacht derives this line of thought from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (II,i), which concludes that one of the effects of socialization is “To breed a
man *with the right to make promises*” (Nietzsche 1968, 276) Schacht claims that this ability, amongst others, is due to specific *perspectives* created within society. Schacht writes that it was “in a social context that this capacity was first and continues to be acquired” (Schacht 1992, 276).

In examining the cogency of this criticism, one must note that Nietzsche’s account of the social layer of consciousness is not impervious to incorporation into Nehamas’ model. Possibly, then, Schacht has succeeded in pointing out another aspect of Nietzsche’s thought to which Nehamas’ model may be applied. One might begin by following Nehamas’ cue and applying his model more rigorously through the investigation of language as a social phenomenon. Nehamas writes: “First, Nietzsche correctly believes that consciousness has a social origin and a social function: it is inherently connected with the need to communicate with others” (Nehamas 1985, 85). Alternatively, the self as a social construction could clearly be seen as a case of a thing being nothing more than the sum of its effects and relations. The notion that the subject for Nietzsche is constituted by a multiplicity of relations seems to be a point of (at least) chiasmic agreement between Schacht and Nehamas (Schacht, 270) —although Schacht takes issue with Nehamas’ theory concerning the unity structuring that multiplicity (Schacht, 272-273).

Finally, it is evident that Nietzsche also felt that there are some essential qualities of the higher man in barbarians too. In the first section of *What is Noble*, Nietzsche writes:

> Let us admit to ourselves unflinchingly how every higher culture on earth has hitherto begun! . . . The noble cast was in the beginning always the barbarian caste: their superiority lay, not in their physical strength, but primarily in their psychical — they were more complete human beings. . .(Nietzsche 1973,257).

Should Nehamas have considered the barbarians as well? Why
Schacht considers Nehamas' neglect of this issue as problematic is puzzling. Nehamas is not principally concerned with this issue.

Nehamas, like Nietzsche, addresses a specific audience, and engages concerns specific to that audience. For Nehamas, these concerns are the dynamics of the creative process undertaken by the higher artistic, creative or "literary" self. With his audience in mind, each author takes for granted a certain state of affairs when selecting a place to begin. This beginning place for Nehamas assumes qualities (like honesty) that Schacht sees as results of "socialization," and barbarian qualities (like the primal expressions of the will to power) as already present in the subject.

Additionally, the fact that Nehamas begins his consideration of the self from the perspective of eternal recurrence indicates that he is acutely aware of the self as a social phenomenon, as we have already seen. The theory of eternal recurrence has a psychological role: that of justifying all of one's past actions before oneself. Eternal recurrence is the existential catalyst that forces one to begin the process of revaluation of all values, the process that overcomes the possibility of nihilism intellectually "in vogue" and socially prevalent in Nietzsche's time.

A requirement for the facing of eternal recurrence is a level of personal honesty—to a degree that goes beyond the "contractual" honesty developed in society. Take Nietzsche's reaction to Augustine's Confessions, for example. In March 1885, Nietzsche wrote to Franz Overbeck:

I have been reading, as relaxation, St. Augustine's Confessions, much regretting that you were not with me. O this old rhetorician! What falseness, what rolling of eyes! How I laughed! . . . What psychological falsity! (for example, when he talks about the death of his best friend, with whom he shared a single soul, he "resolved to go on living, so that in this way his friend would not wholly die." Such things are revoltingly dishonest.) Philosophical value zero! vulgarized Platonism—that is to say, a way of think-
ing was invented for the highest aristocracy of soul, and which he adjusted to suit slave natures. Moreover, one sees the guts of Christianity in this book. I make my observations with the curiosity of a radical physician and psychologist (Middleton, 239-240).

For Nietzsche, the honesty St. Augustine lacks is the honesty present in the sovereign individual and the free spirits. “Honesty—granted that this is our virtue, from which we cannot be free, we free spirits—. . .” (Nietzsche 1973, 227). Here, for both Nehamas and Nietzsche, to look at one’s life and want to change even one aspect is to change it entirely. Hence, each characteristic of one’s self becomes essential to it. Yet, “If we affirm one single moment, we thus [necessarily] affirm not only ourselves but all existence” (Nietzsche 1979, 1032). To fail to affirm one’s life in the face of the “demon who steals after us in our loneliest moments and poses the question of greatest weight” (Nietzsche 1974, 150-151) is to falter, and stagnate the process of self-overcoming. This honesty, which faces the existential demon of eternal recurrence is the same honesty required in becoming who we are—the same honesty that Nietzsche advocates in the concluding remarks of The Gay Science.

Significantly, it is the moment of eternal recurrence in which Nehamas proposes that we should “become who we are.” It may do well here to simply contextualize Nehamas’ remark by quoting him at length to discover the actual thrust of his remarks:

The eternal recurrence signifies my ability to want my life and the world to be repeated just as they are....Being, for Nietzsche, is what one does not want to be otherwise.

What one is, then, is just what one becomes....In the ideal case it is to fit all this into a coherent whole and to [honestly, in the face of the demon] want to be everything that one is: it is to give style to one’s character; to be, we might say, becoming (Nehamas 1985, 191).
In light of our previous discussion of style, it is clear that Nehamas (with Nietzsche) is proposing that we become who we are in the context of “the possibility of the emergence of the type of human being he [Nietzsche] terms higher” (Schacht 1992, 272) and not, as Schacht would have us read Nehamas, in the “rather uninteresting sense in which everyone may be said to do so” (Schacht 1992, 271).

It is at the moment of eternal recurrence that Nehamas introduces his theme of the unification of the characteristics of the self into a “coherent whole,” which is the subject of Schacht’s fourth and final criticism. For Schacht, the two notions of the essential indispensability of each element of the self, and the creative (selective and stylistic) self, are irreconcilable. Schacht’s criticism seems to be that he feels Nehamas’ rendering of the self as a unified whole when becoming who we are is unqualified, and does not reflect the selective and transformative process of “becoming the higher human being one may have it in one to become” (Schacht 1992, 274).

Yet, in Nehamas’ model, it is precisely on this level that it makes the world of difference “what one does, how one does it, or even whether one comes to ‘identify oneself with all one’s actions’” (Schacht 1992, 271). The higher man, the artist of value, the legislator, must first be willing to see the truth, whether it is to his liking or not. The strength of character that Nietzsche demands here, at the moment of honesty with oneself, is a requirement, a prerequisite, for the further development of one’s style.

In this light, it is absolutely clear that neither Nietzsche, nor Nehamas, means to “commend the attainment of such unity without any qualification with respect to the kind of life led” (Schacht 1992, 273-274). Schacht may do well to “doubt” any reading of Nietzsche that does not incorporate such issues, but it remains unclear why he should raise these doubts here (Schacht 1992, 273), as he does against Nehamas.

It is equally unclear why Schacht feels Nehamas to be on
“less solid ground when he attempts to yoke this idea [of style. . .] to his construal of the self for Nietzsche as the totality of what one ‘thinks, wants, and does’” (Schacht 1992, 272). Again, the sense in which Nehamas proposes the notion of self-as-totality is clear and sound. The totality is a creative and qualified one, affirming life in the face of eternal recurrence and validating life through art and personal style. Nehamas has sound cause for this emphasis. Nietzsche writes as much himself in *The Gay Science*.

*One thing is needful.* -To “give style” to one’s character - a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason even weakness delight the eye.... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste is good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! (Nietzsche 1974, 290)

Although this unitive aspect of the personality has not, until Nehamas, been given a central interpretative function, it is nonetheless an acute observation that marks a continuity in Nietzsche’s life and thought.

In summary, Schacht concludes his two major criticisms with the following counsel:

If one returns with *this* [Schacht’s] ‘model’® in mind, to a consideration of the sort of self that Nietzsche thinks of as being attained and created as one becomes the higher sort of human being, one may have it in one to be, it would seem as though Nehamas’ idea of ‘perfect unity’ should not be read into it (Schacht 1992, 280).

Yet, after the preceding, careful examination of what exactly
Schacht proposes in his model, it is reasonable to say that Nehamas is making the same claims. Schacht wishes his reader to consider a model that involves doing more with our lives than rendering them unified wholes, in which everything about ourselves is equally essential, and a way is found of integrating everything with everything else. For artists are *selective*, and are *transformers* of their material as well (Schacht 1992, 279).

Clearly, this is exactly what Nehamas is proposing. He is not proposing a unity like a heap of sand, or a mud puddle of colour on a palate, as Schacht seems to make him say. Rather, the unity is like that of a sand castle, and the unity of colour on the painter’s canvas. Nehamas does not mean that each aspect plays the same role in our charisma, character and shaping of our style. Yet, every aspect of that unity is essential to the final character, the identity, of the self that is produced.

**IV- The Resolution**

In conclusion, it should be clear that Nehamas’ model withstands each of Schacht’s criticisms. If the *Life as Literature* model “cannot be readily accepted” into the canon of modern Nietzsche scholarship, it must first be refuted on different grounds, and for better reasons than those provided by Schacht.

When viewed against the criterion of rendering Nietzsche’s thought a coherent and self consistent (unified?) whole, Nehamas’ model extends beyond the regions mapped on the canonic charts of previous cartographers like Schacht. With Nehamas’ model, one can account for the social aspect and origin of the self Schacht claims is lacking. Further, with its emphasis on the unitive, Nehamas’ model succeeds in reconciling two important elements of the Nietzschean self that remain in conflict according to
Schacht’s own account. Clearly, for Nietzsche, “It is the unity of these acts that gives rise to the self, and not, as we often think, the fact of a single self that unifies conflicting tendencies” (Nehamas 1985, 182). Thus, each elemental act is essential, and yet the produced unity is a creative expression of individual style. This reason alone makes Nehamas’ model worthy of more serious application and study.

Yet, this promising interpretative application is not the only success of Nehamas’ aesthetical model. Nehamas also makes an exceptionally persuasive case for the overall soundness of the Nietzsche represented in his thesis:

Nietzsche...looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, as if it were a literary text...[or at least, as has already been established.] Many of his very strange ideas appear significantly more placeable in this light (Nehamas 1985, 3).

One does not have to look beyond Nehamas’ own research to locate the testimonial evidence from Nietzsche that make sound his claims; to a large extent, I have only had to reiterate them on his behalf. The only additional evidence I have provided is the confessionals from Nietzsche’s letters. This field of evidence also unequivocally supports Nehamas’ reading. As a final reflection, I draw the reader’s attention to Nietzsche’s letter to Jakob Burckhardt of Naumburg, August, 1882, which concludes as follows:

Apart from this, I have reached a point at which I live as I think, and perhaps I have meanwhile learned really to express what I think. In this respect I shall regard your judgement as a verdict; in particular, I would like you to read the “Sanctus Januarius” (Book 4), to see if it communicates itself as a coherent whole.

And my verses?
Trusting in you, with best wishes

Your Friedrich Nietzsche (Middleton 1969, 190-191).

This is the same book about which Nietzsche has said: “there is an image of myself in it. . .”\textsuperscript{9} With this kind of testimony, I feel that it is not at all unwarranted to attribute to Nietzsche the belief that “The structure of a style is like the structure of a personality” (Danto 1981, 37). Hence, in the presence of the evidence that has been presented in this paper, I find grounds for the necessity of a more thorough investigation into Nehamas’ central thesis, with the aim of determining not whether, but how far, it penetrates into the life, thought and work of Friedrich Nietzsche.

David M. Godden
York University

REFERENCES


Kinesis


SECONDARY SOURCES


Endnotes

1. The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of all those advisors, editors, and instructors from both Wilfrid Laurier University and York University who facilitated the completion of this work. Were it not for their help, this essay would remain unarticulated. My thanks especially to Dr. Renato Crisiti for his instructive comments and Dr. Rockney Jacobsen for his direction.

2. It is clear one could attribute to Nietzsche a “positive” view of human
conduct in relation to, and at the level of, the herd, and society. The sympathetic reader will realize that this is not what Nietzsche means at the level of style, nor what Nehamas takes him to mean.

3. The last line has been elsewhere translated as “There’s no one alive today who could write anything like this Zarathustra.” Peter Fuss and Henry Shapiro, *Nietzsche: A Self Portrait From His Letters.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 74.

— as cited in: Nehamas, 141.

4. See also: a letter to Rodhe dated July 15, 1882; of *Joyful Wisdom IV.* “...there is an image of myself in it...” (Middleton 1969, 187).

a letter to Franz Overbeck, received February 11th, 1883; of *Zarathustra I.*

This book, about which I wrote to you, the work of ten days, now seems to me like my last will and testament. It contains an image of myself in the sharpest focus, as I am, once I have thrown off the whole burden. It is poetry, not a collection of aphorisms. (Middleton 1969,207)

a letter to Gast dated end of August 1883; of *Zarathustra I and II*

The detail contains an incredible amount of personal experience and suffering
which is intelligible only to me - there were some pages which seemed to me to drip with blood.

It is for me a most enigmatic fact that I really could do both parts this year. A figure that occurs in practically all my writings -- "risen superior to oneself" -- has become a reality. O, if only you knew what this in itself means. You trunk a hundred times too well of me, friend Gast! [no signature] (Middleton 1969, 218)

5. Meaning consciousness structures or ways of behaving and thinking about oneself and the world.

6. Nietzsche writes: “In the actual world, in which everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and to think away anything means to condemn and think away everything” (Nietzsche 1979, 584)

7. Saying in part, “...We, however, would seek to become what we are, the new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves, and creating ourselves! ... And therefore, three cheers for physics! And still louder cheers for that which impels us thereto—our honesty.” (Nietzsche 1974, 335)
Kinesis

8. Stressing the originally social nature and self, and culminating in the selective and creative artistic construction of the self.

9. See note 3 above.